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Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building
Abstract

Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building:
The Hutubi Rural Social Security Loan Program in China*

The Hutubi Rural Social Security Loan program is a policy innovation in a rural area of
China by loaning savings in social security accounts back to peasants for them to
purchase assets for agricultural and other development. In contrast to the nationwide
recession in rural social security, this program has shown its success in proliferating rural
social security funds and retaining social security participants. With a focus on the
administrative data of the loan program, this study aims to provide an in-depth
understanding of the loan program and examine how asset building is possible for the
poor when institutional incentives are offered. The findings show that when proper policy
incentives are provided, poor peasants can build assets. The Hutubi program may be a
good model for other rural areas in China and other developing countries.

Keywords: Asset building, Social security, Rural China, Microcredit, Savings,
Institutional incentives
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Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building:
The Hutubi Rural Social Security Loan Program in China

Asset-based policy has received increasing attention worldwide as a promising
direction for domestic policy development. Supplementing traditional income-support
social programs, asset-based policy promotes household saving and asset accumulation.
For example, in the United States, employer-sponsored retirement plans (such as 401k
and 403b) and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) have been in practice to promote
security after retirement; and the Individual Development Account (IDA) program has
been implemented in more than 40 states to encourage low-income families to build
assets (Warren & Edwards, 2006). In the United Kingdom, the universal Child Trust
Fund, a savings and investment account for children, was initiated in 2005 (Loke &
Sherraden, 2006). In Singapore, the Central Provident Fund, a comprehensive social
security savings plan has become increasingly successful over several generations (Loke
& Sherraden, 2006). In addition, asset building demonstration projects have spread to
other countries, including Australia, Canada, Peru, and Uganda.
Despite similar goals of these programs—to encourage saving and asset accumulation,
the incentives and institutional structure may vary in different social contexts. For
instance, with an average match rate of about 2:1, participants of the IDAs program in the
US accumulated approximately $700 per year in IDAs for purposes such as buying a first
home, education, or a small business (Schreiner, Clancy & Sherraden, 2002). The Child
Trust Fund in the UK allows children born on or after September 1, 2002 to receive a
£250 voucher from the government to start an account, with an additional £250 for lowincome families (U.K. Parliament, 2004). In addition to matching deposits and
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government seed funds, institutional incentives can also include, but are not limited to:
direct deposit, tax-free earnings, and achievable savings goals. As suggested by Beverly
and Sherraden (1999), institutional factors of asset-based programs, including access,
information, incentives, facilitation, expectations, restrictions, and security, may
contribute to the success of the aforementioned policies. Empirical evidence from IDA
programs supports this perspective (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007).
To include low-income populations in asset building, it may be especially important
to provide incentives because poor people tend to take current needs as a priority, and in
the short run, saving has less marginal effect on their well-being. Inclusion of the poor in
asset accumulation is a major challenge for the development of asset-based policy. This
case study will explore how institutional mechanisms are built into the Hutubi Rural
Social Security loan program, a local policy initiative in northwest China, and how the
program has successfully promoted asset building in rural areas.
Hutubi is a remote county located 70 kilometers west of Urumqi in the Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region of northwest China. The county has 24 ethnic groups with a
total population of 207,200, among which 31,000 live in rural areas. Most rural
households in this county engage in farming and livestock raising. In 2004, the county’s
per capita annual net income for rural households was ¥5,510 (approximately US$689),
significantly lower than its urban counterparts, ¥9,422 at the national level and ¥7,503 at
the provincial level (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004).
As part of Hutubi rural social security, which is based on saving by the household,
the loan program allows peasants to mortgage their social security savings to obtain loans
for the purposes of purchasing livestock and farming tools. Compared with saving solely
for old age, the loan program provides additional incentives for peasants to invest in
Center for Social Development
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productive assets, such as tools, equipment, and livestock (Siegel & Alwang, 1999).
Through analysis of administrative data, this study explores how the loan mechanism was
developed and its consequences for Hutubi rural social security and peasants.
Background
Rural Social Security in China
Peasants in Hutubi County, like those in other areas of rural China, did not have any
form of social security program until 1992 (Béland & Yu, 2004; China Ministry of Civil
Affairs, 1992). Different from the traditional pay-as-you-go social security system in
most welfare states, China’s rural social security is an asset-building program relying
mainly on personal savings in individual social security accounts. The China Rural Social
Security Scheme of 1992 allows peasants between 20 and 60 years of age to participate in
rural social security by contributing a portion of their (after-tax) income to individual
old-age accounts. Participation in rural social security is voluntary and individuals can
withdraw at any time. Rural social security funds are raised mainly by individual
contributions and supplemented by collective contributions if possible. Collective
contributions are made by villages or rural enterprises, depending on the local economic
situation, as matching funds for individual accounts. Collective entities (e.g., villages and
rural enterprises) that make contributions receive tax credit. This policy is managed at the
county level by the local rural social security office. Rural social security funds cannot be
used for direct investment (e.g., investment in real estate or the stock market) (China
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1992). In most cases, the funds can only be saved in a bank
account. Individuals are allowed to withdraw funds from their accounts when they reach
60 years of age or encounter emergencies, such as natural disasters.
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Thus, rural social security aims to provide economic security to elderly people in
rural areas. However, this policy has had shortcomings from its inception. First,
individual contributions are too low to ensure economic security in old age. The
individual contribution is set at an extremely low level of between ¥2-20 (US$0.25-2.5)
per month (China Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1992). At this level, peasants can hardly
accumulate even a minimal level of financial resources to meet economic needs in later
life. For example, a 50-year-old individual who started contributing the maximum of ¥20
per month in 1994 would receive ¥50 per month beginning in 2004 (given the fixed bank
savings interest rate1. That would be an annual social security income of ¥600, roughly
equal to the 2004 rural poverty line (¥627) (Peng & Song, 2002). The benefit of rural
social security is woefully low. Although the county government can adjust individual
contributions depending on the local economic situation, the individual contributions set
by the program cannot create much security for rural populations.
Second, structural incentives for asset accumulation do not seem to be very
effective. Collective contributions to match savings is the major incentive provided by
this policy. However, in reality the majority of program participants do not receive
matching funds from collective entities (Wang & Zhang, 2006; Xu, 2006). This occurs
only in rich rural communities on the south-east coast. In other words, the so-called
matched collective contribution has no significant effect on rural social security
participation in Hutubi County.
Third, rural social security funds are constrained from investment. Rural social
security funds cannot be used for any form of direct investment. The only legitimate

1

The individual contribution rate has increased substantially in few areas where rural social security has
resumed since 2005. The new rate varies across the country.
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ways to keep funds from depreciation in value are (1) to save as bank savings or (2) to
purchase low-risk bonds or securities issued by the central government. The rapid
economic growth in China in the last decade, however, has been accompanied by bank
savings interest rates decreasing over time while the inflation rate has been increasing
since 1996, which makes rural security funds vulnerable to depreciation (Peng & Song,
2002). In many places, interests earned by rural social security funds are not even
sufficient to cover managerial expenses of the program.
Thus, institutional incentives provided by rural social security are quite weak, and
this has limited its effectiveness in encouraging peasants to save for their old-age
security. Eventually, a peasant’s commitment to rural social security depends on his/her
concern about economic prospects and desire to balance current consumption and saving
for later life. In the short history of rural social security, the absence of effective
incentives has regretfully led to the sharp decline in the number of participants, dropping
from over 80 million in 1998 to 54 million in 2003 (State Council of the People's
Republic of China, 2004; Peng & Song, 2002). Afflicted by many challenges in
management, most rural areas, including Hutubi County, stopped recruiting new
participants into the rural social security program in 1999.
Rural Social Security Loan Program in Hutubi
The Hutubi rural social security loan program was initiated in 1998 by a local rural
social security office, with the goal of addressing some of the above institutional flaws.
In cooperation with local bank, the rural social security agency allows participants to use
their own or others’ social security savings as legal collateral to borrow loans up to 50%
of their individual social security savings to purchase physical assets related to
agricultural production, such as livestock, seeds, and agricultural tools, or other
Center for Social Development
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productive uses (Hutubi County Bureau of Civil Affairs, 2005). This innovative loan
program, on the one hand, expands the investment options of the rural social security
fund and increases interest gains of the social security fund from mortgage loans; on the
other hand, it creates an additional incentive—access to mortgage loans, and an
additional goal for peasants—investments in agricultural assets or other investments such
as children’s education or building a house. The creator of the Hutubi program, Mr. Guo
Xincai, has referred to this as taking “dead assets” and making them “alive.”
Compared to the conventional access to loans by using land or a house as collateral
or by applying for a group loan with at least four other families joining together, the
innovative Hutubi loan program provides unique intuitional benefits for peasants to
access and obtain small loans (Zhang, 2006). In most rural areas of China, peasants’
needs for microcredit are barely met due to lack of well-established financial services.
Hence, this new form of loan has been acclaimed by Hutubi peasants because it meets
their financial needs.
To sum up, the loan program, which is based on the existing social security policy,
has created a scenario with dual incentives and dual asset building (Figure 1): secure
savings and matching contributions provide primary incentives for peasants to build
assets for old age, and the availability of loans has created a secondary incentive,
allowing peasants to borrow for agricultural and other development, which can lead to
further asset building.
This study provides a closer examination of the administrative data of the Hutubi
rural social security loan program through descriptive statistics on the loans and then a
focus on the success of the policy innovation.
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Data
The Hutubi rural social security loan program administrative data were obtained by
a research team from Washington University’s Center for Social Development in the
summer of 2006. The data provide detailed information about each loan since 1998,
including the borrower’s demographics, the loan amount, the interest rate, and the
expected and actual loan term.
The data cover 1,286 cases of mortgage loans between 1998 and 2006. In this
program, mortgage loan refers to the money borrowed by a rural social security
participant, with the social security savings being mortgaged. Each loan does not exceed
50% of the total balance (the rate was increased to 70% in 2005). The borrower may also
use social security savings of their relatives, neighbors, or friends for the purpose of a
mortgage loan. In reviewing the data, we decided to exclude 23 mortgage loan cases, in
which the borrower is not an individual but an agency or a company. Consequently, the
analysis uses a final sample of 1,263.
Program Statistics
Demographic Characteristics
Most of the borrowers are male (n=1,080, 85.62%); only 14.4% (n=181) are female
(Table 1). This can possibly be explained by the fact that most households in China are
headed by males. Ethnicity breakdown shows that over 90% of borrowers are Han and
less than 8% are from the three major minority groups in the local area: Hui (3.6%), Wei
Wu Er (1.8%), and Ha Sa Ke (2.2%). The percentage of minority participants is lower
than the overall share of ethnic minority populations in the Hutubi County (22.4%)
(Xinjiang Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Borrowers are from the four sub-counties (Zhen) of
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the Hutubi County—Da Feng Zhen, Yuan Hu Cun Zhen, Wu Gong Tai Zhen, and Er Shi
Li Dian Zhen.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The distribution of borrowers’ current age (as of 2006) is as follows: 4.6% (n=57) of
borrowers are between 20 and 29 years old; 29.7% (n=367) are between 30 and 39;
respondents between 40 and 49 have the highest percentage (n=451, 36.5%); less than
10% of borrowers (n=87, 7%) of are 60 years and above. This age distribution is slightly
different from that at which the loan was borrowed. Two borrowers were below 20 years
old when they took the loan. Twelve percent of borrowers (n=148) received the loan
when their ages were between 20 and 29. This percentage is much higher than that in the
current age distribution.
Loan Information
Loan amount. The average amount of loan is ¥6,072 (SD=¥5,993), and the median is
¥4,500 (Table 2). Given the county’s per capita annual net income of rural Households of
¥5,510 in 2004, with the loan program, borrowers may receive a loan with the amount
almost equivalent to their annual per capita net income.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Interest rate. A loan’s interest rate is the same as a bank loan interest rate. Between
1998 and 2006, the interest rate for mortgage loan ranged between 0.53% and 0.81%.
About 46% (575) of cases have the interest rate of 0.70%. The amount of interest2 paid
ranges from ¥9 to ¥5,974.
The ratio between the amount of interest paid and the amount of loan suggests
cost-benefit analysis for borrowers. The average of this ratio turns out to be 0.116
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(SD=0.088) and the median is 0.093, which indicate that a typical borrower has to pay
about 10% of the loan as interest.
Clearance. The average expected loan term is 639 days (SD =459), longer than
the average of the actual loan term (484 days), the number of days between the date of
receiving the loan and the date of returning the all the loan plus the interest. In other
words, most of loans were returned prior to expected returned dates. As of July 31, 2006,
972 mortgage loan cases (77%) had been returned. If we exclude mortgage loan cases in
20063, the return rate is much higher (96%). Among the returned cases, nearly 71% were
returned prior to the expected return date indicated on the loan contract. It took 279
borrowers (29%) a longer than expected term to return loans, at the cost of paying more
interest at a higher (punitive) interest rate.
Social security accounts. On average, each loan has 5.47 social security savings
accounts involved as mortgages. This suggests that most borrowers used social security
savings other than their own. It is perhaps not surprising that the number of social
security savings accounts and the amount of loan are highly correlated (r=0.71, p<0.001).
More information will be available as we divide the amount of the loan by the number of
savings accounts. The mean of this new variable is ¥1,281 (SD=¥1,081), and the median
is ¥1,077, which indicates on average how much a borrower can borrow from each
mortgaged social security savings account.
Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building: A Closer Look
The administrative data, combined with some other information, allows us to
closely see the successful outcomes of the dual incentive and dual asset building
2

The amount of interest is calculated by loan amount * interest rate/30 * number of days.
The reasons to exclude mortgage loan cases in 2006 is that most loans will not be returned until the fall
(after harvests).
3

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

9

Dual Incentives and Dual Asset Building
structure. We will examine trends in the social security funds, number of participants,
savings in the individual account, loan for assets leading to production, and number of
loans processed over the years.
Social Security Fund Increased
While rural social security has been in recession nationwide during the past eight
years, the Hutubi Rural Social Security Fund has grown at a rate of 7% each year, from
¥12 million (about US$1.5 million) in early 1998 into ¥24 million (about US$3 million)
by the end of 2005, “outperforming the meager bank interest rate of 2.25%” (Bai, 2005).
By 2005, the fund has already doubled through compound interest (Bai, 2005). As shown
in Table 3, during the three years of suspension of the loan program (1999-2001), the
increase rate of the rural social security fund was less than during the other years. In
other words, the loan program successfully generated interest gains that increase social
security funds against inflation and contribute to long-term stability.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Retention of Participants
As mentioned above, between 1998 and 2003, the rural social security roll in the
nation dropped from 80 million to 54 million (CASS, 2000; Tang, 2001). In 1997, a year
before the loan program was initiated in Hutubi, the total number of participants in rural
social security decreased by nearly 15% from over 10,000 to about 8,600. In the
subsequent eight years, however, the number of participants remained steady at 8,600.
This may indicate that creation of the loan program has become an effective way to retain
participants4.

4

Because of the suspension of the program, the total number of participants did not increase until 2005.
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Savings in Individual Social Security Accounts Increased
While this information is not directly available from the administrative data, the
increase in individual social security savings accounts may be reflected in the loan
information. Essentially, the total amount of loan available to a borrower depends on the
number of social security accounts mortgaged and the amount of saving in each account.
In other words, the ratio between the amount of loan and the number of mortgaged
accounts by year can provide an estimation of savings in a typical individual account.
The data (Figure 2) show that this ratio increases from ¥623 in 1998, to ¥974 in 2002, to
¥1,530 in 2003, and to ¥1,561 in 2004, indicating that the average amount of savings in
individual accounts is increasing over the years. By this measure, savings in a typical
account in 2004 is nearly 2.5 times that in 1998.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Peasants’ Physical Assets Increased
Peasants take out loans mainly for purchasing physical assets related to
agricultural/pastoral production (97.7%). A majority (56.8%) of peasants used the loan to
purchase livestock (cows and sheep); other investments include seeds (38.4%), electrical
farming equipments (1%), small business (0.9%), and transportation tools (0.6%) (Zhang,
2006). When loans are used for agricultural and/or pastoral production, it can be expected
that household assets will increase. For example, a peasant who borrows ¥16,000 to
purchase two cows can expect to have a monthly income of ¥1,000 or even more.
As mortgage loans are mostly used for agricultural/pastoral purposes, the data show
a strong seasonal pattern in the loan start and return dates each year. Generally speaking,
the loan start dates concentrate in the planting season (March, April, May) while the loan
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return dates concentrate in the harvest season (September, October, November) (Figures
3 & 4).
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here]
Number of Loans Increased
As shown in Table 4, the number of mortgage loans varies across years. Over 50%
of mortgage loans (n=656) were issued in 2002 and about 20% (n=258) in 2006. No
information is available for 1999, 2000, and 2001 because the mortgage loan program
was suspended in these years due to procedural controversies between government
entities in the local area. Fewer than 100 mortgage loans were taken in 1998 and 2004.
With the procedural and policy issues resolved, 2002 witnessed a significant increase in
the total amounts of loans, loan interest, and number of social security accounts,
exceeding all the other years (see Table 5).
[Insert Tables 4 & 5 about here]
Discussion
The Hutubi rural social security loan practice by the local government has drawn
considerable interest from policy makers. Authorized by China Ministry of Labor and
Social Security, Hutubi resumed its rural social security program in 2005 by recruiting
new participants. In the meantime, it has become exemplary for other underdeveloped
rural areas in developing social security. In carefully reflecting on the Hutubi practice,
implications and limitations can be identified.
Policy Implications
Microcredit scheme in poor rural areas. In many developing countries, the lack
of well-established financial services and microcredit has limited peasants’ access to
loans for poverty alleviation. The Hutubi rural social security loan program suggests that
Center for Social Development
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access to loans, mortgaging social security accounts, loaning, using the capital for
production investments, and paying back loans can provide a practical avenue for
peasants to improve their circumstances and also build credit. This gives peasants the
possibility to access other financial services.
The poor and financial skills. Evidence indicates a positive relationship between
financial skills and asset building (Zhan & Schreiner, 2005). For most rural populations,
limited financial opportunities in rural areas may have formed insurmountable
institutional barriers for the poor to build financial skills. The loan program, although not
intended as formal financial education, can help individuals through loaning practice to
improve financial skills and better understand the financial system.
Effects of assets on risk taking. In most cases, investment in physical assets for
production can lead to better economic well-being, though investment is simultaneously a
risk to some extent. With the loan program, peasants obtain loans for agricultural or
pastoral investment. Savings together with loans provide a foundation for risk taking,
which can move peasants toward greater economic benefits.
Social network. The importance of social networks is implicitly reflected in the loan
program in that it allows peasants to use social security accounts of family members,
relatives, and friends for loans. Social networks expand an individual’s access to
financial resources on the one hand, and on the other hand pose social pressure on this
individual to make proper use of the loan and return the loan to restore the social security
account. Unfortunately, the current data do not have information that would illuminate
credit development, financial self-education, and the role of social networks.
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Limitations
Despite the apparent successes of the Hutubi rural social security loan program, its
limitations should also be noted.
Potential risk. The current loan program has a high pay-back rate (96%) for several
reasons. (1) The use of loan is strictly defined. In most cases, it has to be invested in
physical assets for production. (2) Availability of loans is primarily based on an
individual’s social network, which imposes pressure for paying off the loan. (3) Peasants
are well aware of the consequence of not repaying the loan—losing social security
benefits in later life. Although the loan program is a low-risk policy for local
administration, it could mean a high risk for individuals in a particular loan case. As far
as individuals are concerned, those who borrow would lose social security benefits if they
fail to repay the loans. In this regard, the loan program has elements conflicting with
social security itself. Of course, if the loan program generates greater wealth among
farmers, this implies security in old age.
Loan as incentive. In the Hutubi program, the loan has indeed become an effective
incentive for peasants to join in rural social security and to build household assets. Note
that all of this occurs where the rural financial system is underdeveloped, with existing
financial services minimally accessible to most peasants. If this situation were changed
with improvements in the financial system, the loan program as an incentive for asset
building might be weakened to some degree.
Equity issue. In some countries, government seed funds and matching funds are
made available to low-income participants in asset-building programs, such as the IDA
program in the US and the Child Trust Fund in the UK. Compared with those policy
features, the Hutubi loan program lacks a consideration of equity, because availability of
Center for Social Development
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loans depends on an individual’s own saving and/or social network. In other words,
people who are extremely poor or have no social network are less likely to benefit from
the loan program.
Conclusion
The Hutubi rural social security loan program is apparently successful in developing
policy incentives to encourage asset building in a rural area of China. Incentives tailored
to local situations can serve the local people very well. Structural incentives, when
appropriately designed and practically implemented, can encourage the poor to build
assets. In the rural context of Hutubi, matching funds are not feasible because of the
limited financial capacity of the local government; tax benefits are not feasible either
because this is not compatible with the existing tax system. But, access to small loans and
rudimentary financial services fit peasants’ financial needs. Like Hutubi, most rural areas
of the developing world have limited financial services for peasants. The Hutubi loan
program shows that asset building is possible when proper financial services are offered.
This may be a good model for other rural areas in China and other developing countries.
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Appendix
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of borrowers
Variable
Frequency
Percent (%)
Gender (n=1,261)
Male
1080
85.7
Female
181
14.3
Ethnicity (n=1,263)
Han
1162
92.0
Hui
45
3.6
Wei Wu Er
23
1.8
Ha Sa Ke
28
2.2
Others
5
0.4
Age as of 2006 (n=1,237)
4.6
20-29
57
29.7
367
30-39
451
36.5
40-49
22.2
50-59
275
7.0
87
>59
Age at which loan was borrowed (n=1,237)
0.2
2
<20
148
12.0
20-29
31.5
30-39
389
35.5
439
40-49
17.2
213
50-59
46
3.7
>59
Sub-County
Da Feng Zhen
27.0
341
Yuan Hu Cun Zhen
11.5
145
Wu Gong Tai Zhen
27.6
359
Er Shi Li Dian Zhen
425
33.7
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Table 2: Loan information
Variable
Amount of loan (¥)
Amount of loan by year (¥)
1998
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

N
1,263
1,262

Interest rate (%)
Expected loan term (days)
Actual loan term (days)
Loan return status
Returned
Not returned yet
Loan return status for 2006 cases
Returned
Not returned yet
Loan return status for cases in all
years*
Returned
Not returned yet

Mean (SD)
6,072.34
(5992.61)

Median
4,500

7,870.83
5,561.13
7,772.83
5,890.59
6,895.65
6,187.60

(7,790.88)
(4,919.70)
(1,1248.95
)
(3,968.92)
(7,962.17)
(4,564.99)

5,000
4,000
4,150
5,000
4,000
4,550

1,263
1,263

0.71403
639

(.46870)
(459)

0.6975
243

955

484

(326)

326

%

1,263

When was the loan returned?
On time
Early return
Delayed return

956

Amount of interest (¥)

959

698.86

(842.82)

406.22

Interest/amount ratio
Interest/amount ratio by return status
On time
Early return
Delayed return

952
954

0.116

(0.088)

0.093

0.045
0.129
0.113

(0.005)
(0.115)
(0.169)

0.046
0.126
0.054

1,194

5.43

(4.70)

4.00

1,194

1,218.51

(1,081.32)

1,077.50

Number of social security cards per
loan
Amount per social security card per
loan
* Excluding 2006.

Freq.
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972
291

76.96
23.04

4
254

1.55
98.45

968
37

96.32
3.68

13
664
279

1.36
69.46
29.18
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Table 3: Hutubi rural social security fund by year
Year*
Total amount
Annual interest
Increase rate
(in thousands ¥) (in thousands ¥)
(%)
1998
16,757.9
1,673.0
9.98
1999**
16,959.6
1,106.1
6.52
2000**
17,708.6
1,038.9
5.87
2001**
18,473.2
898.6
4.86
2002
19,748.6
1,412.4
7.15
2003
20,729.7
1,168.4
5.64
2004
22,022.8
1,463.2
6.64
2005
23,629.0
1,639.4
7.40
* As of the end of each year.
** The loan program was suspended in these three years.

Table 4: Loans by year (N=1,263)
Year
Frequency
Percent (%)
1998
24
1.90
1999
1
.08
2002
656
51.94
2003
92
7.28
2004
85
6.73
2005
147
11.64
2006
258
20.43
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Year
1998
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total*

Total loan
amount (¥)
142,100
3,468,100
715,100
500,700
1,027,160
1,596,400
5,853,160

Table 5: Loans by year
Total amount of Increase rate
interest (¥)
(%)
22,724.4
16
542,284.6
15.6
47,399.1
6.6
25,596.2
5.1
45,977.4
4.5
N/A
N/A
683,981.70
11.7

Number of social
security accounts used
102
3,691
258
378
743
1,306
5,172

* Not including 2006.

Figure 1: Dual incentives and dual asset building

Rural social
security
saving & loan

Primary incentives:
• Secure savings
• Matching contributions

Savings for old age

Secondary incentive:
Loan for production or
other development

Building assets
through investments
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Average loan amount/card (¥)

Figure 2: Average loan amount per social security account by year
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Figure 3: Loan start date by year

Figure 4: Loan return date by year
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